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DO PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS PROMOTE REGIONAL GROWTH?  
EVIDENCE FROM AN EMERGING ECONOMY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
A large literature exists on the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. The role of government and public banks in building this relationship has however, 
remained contentious. In this study in a sub-national level of analysis in the context of large 
emerging economy, India we raise the question what is the relative impact of public banks in 
economic growth in the lagging regions vis-à-vis leading regions? Do they matter more than 
the private and foreign banks? To address these problems, we apply dynamic GMM panel 
estimator on an unbalanced panel dataset drawn from 25 Indian states covering period 
1996/97 to 2008/09. Although our study is in the Indian context, it is relevant for developing 
countries for mainly two reasons: government ownership of banks has been widely prevalent 
in developing countries and in many large countries in a federation set-up inter-state 
differences may exist with multiple ownership of the financial sector.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
A large literature exists on the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. The role of government and public banks in building this relationship has however, 
remained contentious. Some studies suggest that public banks due to their nature of 
ownership can overcome problems of regional segmentation in the credit markets; weak 
institutions; inadequate regulatory framework; high transactions costs, asymmetric 
information and risks in lending capital  (Besley 1994: Greenwald, Levinson and Stiglitz 
1993; Dow & Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997; Rodríguez-Fuentes 1998; Önder & Özyildirim  2010; 
Stiglitz 1989). Private and foreign banks in contrast, may be risk averse and reluctant to lend 
to the economically weak regions due to lack of developed institutions, risk perception of 
projects and expectations of low returns. Foreign banks may be especially reluctant and risk 
averse due to cultural barriers and difficulties in recovering loans (Mian 2006). Public banks 
therefore, play gap filling role and allow lagging regions realize higher growth than would be 
possible if the financial services are left to market mechanisms. This supportive role of public 
banks, often referred as development view, primarily emerged in the fifties and sixties due to 
the specific needs of newly independent developing countries: urgency to catch-up with 
developed countries; large projects size; lumpy investments, and capital scarcity 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). 
Government ownership can also be useful in building trust in savers, enabling improved 
outreach through the spread of bank branches, and help develop banking habits of the 
population. Porter (1966) noted that the development of banking habits would lead to 
increased savings, investment, improved capital allocation efficiency, and increased monetary 
authorities’ ability to stabilise the economy.   
Recent literature suggests that public banks contribute to financial stability, provide lending 
support during periods of instability and economic recessions, avoid extreme moral hazard 
problems associated with private banks; encourage constrained behaviour often accompanied 
with development objectives and promote economic growth (Andrianova et al. 2009; 
Andrianova 2012; Cole 2009; Bertay, Demergüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2012; Coleman and 
Feler 2015; Panizza 2012; Yeyati, Micco and Panizza 2007; Micco and Panizza 2006). Credit 
by the state banks is less procyclical and less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the 
credit through private banks. For example, during the 2008 crisis the government banks 
continued providing funds to the real economy, in contrast to private and foreign banks 
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(Coleman and Feler 2015). Easy availability of funds and government guarantees may also 
make public banks less risk averse, which could lead to increase in credit (Ivashina and 
Scharfstein 2010).  
 
Several studies however, argue that government ownership of banks hurts financial 
development, leads to inefficiencies and low economic growth (La Porta et al. 2002; 
Sapienza 2004; Khwaja & Mian 2005). This is also known as political view and argues that 
government ownership of banks could be politically motivated and leads to misallocation of 
resources. Dinc (2005) in cross-country analysis of 36 emerging countries showed that 
government banks lend more during elections than private banks. Sapienza (2004) finds that 
state owned banks treat politically connected firms differently and charge lower interest rates 
than private banks. 
 
In this study, we raise the following questions: what is the relative impact of public banks in 
economic growth in the lagging regions vis-à-vis leading regions? Do they matter more than 
private and foreign banks? We examine these questions at the sub-national level in the 
context of a large emerging economy, India and use unbalanced panel data drawn from 25 
states covering 1996-2008. In order to see the relative impact of different types of banks, we 
also aim to establish whether the impact of public banks on growth is generally higher than 
private and foreign banks, and also relatively higher in less developed than developed 
regions. For this purpose, we use GMM estimator and employ various tests to test the 
robustness of our results.  
 
Our study is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the novelty of this work lies in the sub-
national level of analysis in a literature predominantly focused on cross-country studies. The 
sub-national units may differ significantly from the national level economically, socially, 
geographically and even politically requiring a different set of policy responses tailored to 
their own specific needs (Kendall 2009). Paying attention to public banks at lower levels also 
matters as alleviating local financial constraints could spur local economic growth (Coleman 
and Feler 2015). The sub-national enquiry is especially important as the states play an 
important role in poverty reduction and achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. The 
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Indian states are also at different stages of development, experiencing varied levels of 
economic growth making this analysis even more relevant.
1
  
 
Secondly, India is currently witnessing substantial debate on its growth revival strategies and 
role of financial sector in this strategy (Rajan 2015). Thirdly, our study relates to post-reform 
period when most restrictions and controls in the financial sector have been lifted. Further, 
few studies have examined the contribution of different bank groups more so, in the context 
of lagging states. Although at the local level, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) explored 
for Italy, Liang (2006) and Chen, Wu and Wen (2013) for China, their studies did not 
examine contributions of specific bank groups to economic growth. Our study contributes in 
this respect as well. Finally, although our study is in the Indian context, it is relevant for 
developing countries in a federation set-up where inter-state differences may exist with 
multiple ownership of the financial sector. Government ownership of banks has been widely 
prevalent in the developing countries; a study of this nature is therefore, useful in reflecting 
on its growth impact.        
 
Our findings suggest that finance matters for growth, and the growth impact of credit offered 
by public banks is stronger than credit offered by private and foreign banks. It is also 
marginally stronger in lagging states and is significant when our model is estimated by 
pooling the data as well as when separate models are estimated for lagging and leading states. 
However, the differential relative impact of public banks in lagging regions is insensitive to 
aggregation. As a result, although public banks generated more growth in general, it is not 
possible to clearly establish whether the growth impact of public banks is higher in lagging 
regions.  
 
Rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses financial sector reforms in 
India. The next section presents theoretical considerations. Section 4 introduces empirical 
model and estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses results and the final section of the study 
concludes. 
 
2. FINANCIAL SECTOR IN INDIA 
                                                          
1
 It can be alluded that in a large country like India with states at varying levels of development, large inter-state 
disparities is akin to cross-country analysis with similar pitfalls. Even within a state there could be substantial 
intra-regional differences.  
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As in many other developing countries, banks are the major financial intermediary in India 
and have multiple ownership structures consisting of public, private and foreign banks. 
Historically, the financial sector before 1960s was fairly free and open. However, it was 
characterised by volatility as a number of banks were either closed or merged with other 
banks. The main causes of bank failures were incompetence of directors; unrestricted loans to 
bank directors or related firms; dishonest management and injudicious investments; 
insufficient paid-up capital and reserves; absence of central bank and lender of last resort 
(Tandon, 1990). 
Arora (2012) classified banks’ role in India’s economic development into 3 stages, stage I-
1947-1969; stage II-1969-1991; and stage III-1991 onwards. In each of these stages different 
policies were experimented with the overall objective of increasing economic growth and 
reduction in poverty. Stage I marked the beginning of the planning era and focus was on 
achieving industrial growth. Large and heavy industries were therefore, the target of planners.  
However, by the early sixties policymakers realized that bank credit to agriculture and poor 
regions was not forthcoming. In stage two therefore, the focus was on agricultural 
development and balanced regional development. Social control and nationalization of banks 
in two phases 1969 and 1980 were the hallmarks of this stage. Overall, all banks were in the 
private sector at the time of the country’s independence, however with the nationalization of 
large banks, most of the banking assets got concentrated in the hands of public banks. An 
outcome of this was increased credit to borrowers in specific sectors such as agriculture and 
rural sector and increased banking outreach (Arora 2012; Cole 2009).  
 
In 1991, financial sector reforms took place which marked the third stage of banks’ role in 
India (Arora 2012). Since then the country’s financial sector, even though still largely 
government controlled, has undergone large-scale transformation with increased competition 
from the private and foreign banks; removal of interest rate controls; improved profitability; 
adoption of prudential and supervision practices and rationalization of bank branches (Gupta, 
Kochhar & Panth 2011). Some studies have found evidence of convergence among different 
types of banks in terms of performance (Bhaumik and Dimova 2004). 
 
Increased competition in the financial sector is reflected in the increased number of foreign 
and private banks in the recent years. While some private banks existed even prior to reforms, 
the entry of new ones was largely initiated in 1993 and subsequently 10 new private banks 
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were set up. In the early 2000s, two large development finance institutions were also 
converted into banking institutions. As at end 2011, there were altogether 89 commercial 
banks of which 26 were public, 20 private and 43 were foreign. The share of assets of private 
banks in total banking sector assets increased from 3.5% in 1991 to 20.2 % in 2012. The 
public banks hold a majority of banking sector assets at 72.7% (much above the statutory 
requirement of 51%) and the remainder is held by private and foreign banks.  
 
As public, private and foreign banks’ regulator, the Reserve Bank of India has brought down 
reserve ratios- cash reserve ratios and statutory liquidity ratios significantly in the post-reform 
period. CRR has been reduced gradually from 15% to 4% and a reduction in SLR is from 
nearly 40% to 20%.  Banks have adopted Basel III guidelines, and the capital reserve 
adequacy ratio for Indian banks in 2014 was 12.8%. These two measures alone have 
increased availability of resources to the banking sector. In the reformed environment, banks 
are also free to decide their deposit interest rates except savings rate. They can also decide 
lending rates except those on exports, small loans and DRI scheme. Reforms were also 
carried out in the inter-bank call money market.  
 
Some measures were taken up to improve credit recovery and enforcement of creditors’ 
rights such as Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of 
Securities Interest Act (SARFAESI) in 2002, Credit Information Bureau Act in 2005 and 
Bankruptcy Act 2016. Several initiatives were taken up on the technological front for 
instance, setting up of Indian Financial Network, introduction of real time gross settlement 
system and core banking solutions across the banks (Mohan and Ray 2017). The 
establishment of Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology by RBI in 
1996 also promoted technological connectivity among the banking sector (Mohan and Ray 
2017). As a result of various reforms, gross non-performing assets as proportion of gross 
advances came down from 15.7% in 1996 to 2.4% in 2009. Capital to risk weighted assets 
ratio of the banks was 12.7% in 2015. The public banks were also allowed to raise funds from 
the market. Recent years have however, witnessed rise in the stressed assets of banking 
system from 9.8% in 2012 to 14.5% in 2015 and for public sector banks from 11.0% to 
17.7% during the same period (Mohan and Ray 2017).  
 
Priority lending requirements however, continue to exist and all banks including foreign 
banks are required to meet targets. Initially targeted at the public banks in 1967-68 and 
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remodelled in 1980, it was subsequently extended to the private banks. According to current 
guidelines, domestic banks have a target of 40% of their bank credit for priority lending. 
Foreign banks with 20 and above branches have also been brought on par with domestic 
banks from 2012 and have to achieve targets over a period of five years. The prescription for 
foreign banks with less than 20 branches is 32 % of bank credit (RBI 2015).  
 
Since the reforms, bank branch expansion has been deregulated and banks are no longer tied 
to the mandatory stipulations of the branch licensing policy of 1977, which required them to 
open branches in four unbanked locations in order to obtain a license for a new branch in an 
area with existing bank branches. While branches of foreign and private sector banks are 
more concentrated in developed areas, public banks are spread out in rural and semi-urban 
areas as well. As at March 2009, 68.6% of total public bank branches were in rural areas, in 
contrast to a poor presence of foreign banks at 1.4% and 12.5% of private banks. Foreign 
banks, on the other hand, were overwhelmingly present in the urban areas (79.5%). Two new 
sets of banks have also been recently set up - payment banks and small finance banks. Not 
much is however, known on the performance of these banks due to their recent origin (Mohan 
and Ray 2017). 
 
Banks in the pre-reform period had the mandate of provision of credit to certain occupations, 
sectors, regions and population. Post-reforms, these stipulations were relaxed or removed 
altogether. Banks thus by and large, had freedom of making credit related decisions. Overall, 
two major changes in the post-reform Indian banking sector were freedom on credit related 
decisions, introduction of prudential norms, and increased competition in the banking sector 
(Bhaumik and Piesse 2006; RBI 2006).  
 
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
  
In regional economic growth theories, finance is often not considered as a variable in regional 
output. Dow & Rodríguez-Fuentes (1997) in their comprehensive survey on the literature on 
regional finance point out that “this lack of interest in financial variables within regional 
economics has often led regional economists to belittle the power of money in explaining 
regional income differences”. On the disregard of financial variables, for instance in a 
8 
 
comprehensive handbook on regional growth theories published in 2009 (Capello and 
Nijkamp 2009) finance was not even considered as an input to regional growth. Kim (2008) 
in a comprehensive survey on theory, facts and policies on spatial inequality and economic 
development also does not acknowledge finance as a likely cause of regional disparities. To 
put this in perspective, the existing literature on the role of finance in different regions is 
generally derived from the mainstream neoclassical theory (Dow & Rodríguez-Fuentes 
1997).    
  
The neoclassical theory presumes that as resources are perfectly mobile, they would move 
into the regions which they deem fit and efficient. The question of some lagging regions 
attracting sufficient capital for economic growth was, therefore, not a part of the neoclassical 
agenda as it assumed that the capital was perfectly mobile and flow of finance merely reflects 
inter-regional differences in terms of resources, employment, output etc. (Dow & Rodríguez-
Fuentes 1997). As large number of firms and entrepreneurs seek funds, the selection of best 
firms guided by returns, would lead to efficient resource allocation (Greenwood & Smith, 
1997). The resources, thus, move into those activities or regions which generate the highest 
returns and may not eventually result in socially desired outcomes as economic self-interest 
guides the individuals or firms.  
 
In practice, capital is not so mobile and may not flow into the less developed regions. In the 
absence of any government intervention, resources would flow into regions and sectors where 
the returns are highest. Low future expectations, increased risks of lending capital; regional 
segmentation in credit markets; weak institutions; inadequate regulatory framework; high 
transactions cost, and asymmetric information are some of the factors affecting resource 
flows into regions and sectors leading to development failure (Dow & Rodríguez-Fuentes 
1997; Önder and Özyildirim  2010; Andersen and Tarp 2003).
2
 Low absorptive capacity of 
the regions and poor infrastructure could lead to poor flow of credit to underdeveloped 
regions (Mehrotra 1992). This possibility of market failure in financial markets due to 
imperfect or asymmetric information has been raised in the theoretical literature (Grossman 
and Stiglitz 1976; Stiglitz 1989).
3
 Market failures are widespread in rural credit market 
                                                          
2
 Information can be explained as factual knowledge and it can be exchanged among individuals (Lapavitsas, 
2003). A market system generates and transmits information and the quality of information disseminated and 
generated is itself a part of economic development (Johnson, 1969). 
3
 Asymmetries in information arise when two individuals enter into a transaction - one individual has lots of 
factual information while the other does not. If these two individuals enter into a trade, the one with the more 
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(agriculture, small businesses) due to imperfect information, enforcement, high risks which 
calls for government intervention in the rural credit markets (Besley 1994).   
 
As mentioned above, since there is market failure the rationale for government intervention is 
justified, though costs and benefits of its intervention should be considered (Yeyati, Micco 
and Panizza 2007). The public sector banks are expected to help correct the market failure; 
assist less developed regions; and provide lending support during periods of financial 
instability (Gerschenkron, 1962; Bertay, Demergüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2012). Low reward 
structure in public banks avoids extreme moral hazard problem in private sector banks; 
encourages constrained behaviour often accompanied with development objectives; and 
lesser financial innovations are some of the factors which could lead public sector banks to 
contribute to economic growth (Adrianova et al. 2009). Direct ownership of banks can also 
build trust of people in the banking system, develop their banking habits leading to financial 
development (Adrianova, Panicos, and Shortland 2002).  
 
Firms (industry), both small and large, also benefit from financial development. Banks as 
financial intermediaries mobilise resources, collect information, monitor projects and manage 
risks and allow innovative ventures to take place (King and Levine 1993). Banks also by 
entering into a long-term relationship with the firms accumulate information benefitting both 
banks (by reducing their monitoring costs) and firms (Antony and Broer 2010). Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) found that industries more dependent on external finance grow faster when 
financial sector is more developed and contribute to economic growth. Firms also have 
greater access to funds when the legal system is more developed (Demirguc- Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1998). Overall, local financial development matters for local economic growth 
as has been documented by several studies (Kendall 2009). 
 
3.2 Theoretical underpinnings of the model 
 
As noted by Odedokun (1996), virtually all the existing empirical studies on the role of 
finance on economic growth have no framework with standard theoretical underpinnings. 
Instead, they generally estimate growth as a function of the measure of financial 
development.  For our purpose, to establish the link between the two, we use the augmented 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
information will gain more, resulting in inefficient outcomes and the market could fail or collapse. It is for this 
reason that the state intervenes to reduce information asymmetries and improve functioning of market.  
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Solow growth model, which was suggested by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), as our 
theoretical framework. Accordingly, we assume that the GDP per capita of a given state can 
be represented by the following Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝛽
(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡)
1−𝛼−𝛽 (1) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the real GDP per capita in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝐾𝑖𝑡 denotes the share of state 
government’s capital expenditure to total expenditure; 𝐻 is literacy rate; 𝐴 represents the 
level of technology; 𝐿 represents the size of productive labour force.  
 
Based on our argument in the earlier sections and following Odedokun (1996), we can 
introduce the financial development as one variable of the model. In addition, considering 
that the growth of a given state is influenced by the degree of industrialization, we can also 
introduce the industrial share of the state GDP as one control variable. Finally, following 
Mankiw and Weil (1992) and Dercon, et al. 2009) and introducing the neoclassical growth 
convergence, our theoretical model of the per capita GDP of a given state can be represented 
by: 
 
(
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
) = 𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛿 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝜏(𝐴𝑡𝐿)
1−𝛼−𝛽−𝛿𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
−𝛾 (2) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the real GDP per capita in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝐾𝑖𝑡 denotes the share of state 
government’s capital expenditure to total expenditure; 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is literacy rate; 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents per 
capita bank credit disbursed by bank type 𝑗 (𝑗=all banks; public, private and foreign banks) in 
state 𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the share of industrial sector output to state level GDP.  
 
4. DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION  
 
4.1 Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy 
 
In order to empirically estimate the significance of the bank credit on the real per capita GDP 
growth of the sample Indian state, we use equation (2) as our theoretical model. Applying the 
natural log and introducing the state specific effect and random error term, our empirical 
model will take the following log-linear functional form: 
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𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + +𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
While all the other variables are as defined before, the constant term (𝛼𝑖) represents 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑡𝐿)
1−𝛼−𝛽−𝛿 ;  𝜇 represents unobserved state specific effect; and 𝜀 is a random error term. 
 
Among the variables, bank credit is expected to generate growth in per capita income as it 
relieves financial constraints, promotes investment and facilitates fuller utilization of 
resources. In our study, we have considered credit data based on utilisation than sanction as 
capital is freely mobile and credit could originate from the deposits in other regions. 
Following Önder and Özyildirim (2010) we have considered per capita bank credit (public, 
private and foreign banks) in our study. 
 
Consistent with the endogenous growth model, human capital stock increases per capita 
income by facilitating creation of new productive ideas, innovation and technology adoption 
and improving allocative efficiency. Most studies consider average years of schooling as an 
appropriate indicator of human capital. Data on average years of schooling is, however, only 
available at the national level. For our purpose, following the previous empirical studies, we 
use literacy rate as a proxy to represent human capital (Kendall 2009). Literacy rates in India 
ranged from 47 in Bihar to 90.68 in Kerala in the 2001 census, which narrowed to 63.82 to 
93.9 respectively in Census 2011.  
 
The ratio of government capital expenditure to total expenditure is included assuming that 
higher state government capital expenditure boosts real income growth, among others, by 
crowding-in private investment, preventing the diminishing returns of private capital, 
increasing the overall total factor productivity of the region, reducing transaction cost, 
increasing aggregate demand and facilitating full capacity utilization (Aschauer 1989, Onder 
and Ozyildirum, 2012). The share of industrial output in state GDP is considered as higher 
share of manufacturing is associated with dynamism, structural change and capital 
accumulation, which are important determinants of growth. It also fosters embodied and 
disembodied technological change and increases real per capita income.   
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In estimating the above model, there are a number of econometric problems that need to be 
addressed. Among others, the coefficient estimates may suffer from endogeneity and 
simultaneity bias. There are two potential sources of endogeneity in our model i.e., the 
correlation between explanatory variables and state specific effects; and correlation between 
explanatory variables and the residual/idiosyncratic error term. The endogeneity bias arises if 
bank credit and other explanatory variables are correlated with unobserved state specific 
effects (𝜇𝑖). The simultaneity bias arises if the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
random error term, such as improvement in economic condition triggers expansion in both 
credit demand and supply or states with best economic prospects might have the most 
financially developed banking system.  
 
Although the fixed effect model could address the endogeneity problem, it comes with a cost. 
This estimator entails loss of information and is based on a very stringent exogeneity 
assumption, namely the explanatory variables are independent or uncorrelated with the initial 
condition of the state (𝑌𝑖𝑡−1)
 
(Wintoki et al. 2012). But this rarely holds and level of bank 
credit, capital expenditure, human capital stock and the share of industrial output could be 
related to the initial condition of the state. Under such situations, since these variables are 
correlated with the idiosyncratic error term, the fixed effect estimator would generate biased 
estimates and error terms could be serially correlated. Although simultaneous equation 
approach can be used to deal with the simultaneity problem, there must be at least one strictly 
exogenous variable in each equation. Getting exogenous instruments however is usually 
difficult. To address these problems, we apply dynamic GMM panel estimator.  
 
We use the GMM estimator introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). This estimator exploits the dynamic relationship inherent in the explanatory 
variables and uses variables as instruments, and eliminates the need for exogenous 
instruments. To control for simultaneity, the estimator uses some combination of past values 
of the variables as valid instruments (Wintoki et al. 2012). Although there are two types of 
GMM estimators, traditionally known as difference and system GMM, due to its additional 
advantages, we use system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998). This estimator includes equation in levels and hence, avoids some drawbacks of 
difference estimator (Wintoki et al. 2012). Accordingly, we estimate the following ‘‘system’’ 
GMM estimator: 
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[
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡
] = 𝛼0 + 𝛾 [
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
] + 𝛽 [
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
] + 𝛿 [
𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡
∆𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜌 [
𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑡
∆𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜏 [
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
Estimating the level and first difference equations simultaneously will generate efficient 
estimates while controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and the 
dynamic relationship between current and past values of the dependent variable. Equation (4) 
is estimated together with orthogonality conditions, including no correlations between lagged 
variables and current period error term; zero correlation between lagged first differences of 
the regressors and unobserved state specific effects, and no serial correlation in the error 
terms
4
.  
 
4.2 Data  
 
Data frequency is annual, but unbalanced and drawn from 25 Indian states covering years 
1996/97-2008/09. Data on real GDP per capita, capital expenditure and bank credit is from 
RBI publications. Data on literacy rate and industrial output is from Central Statistical 
Organisation. For analytical purposes, we group states into leading and lagging based on the 
national average per capita income. Leading states have per capita incomes above national 
average, while those below are lagging (Appendix 1). A similar such grouping (for instance, 
developed /developing, high income /low income) exists in almost all the studies at the sub-
national level in India. Most of the studies rather focus on major states of India excluding 
northern hilly states and north-eastern states (Sachs, Bajpai & Ramiah 2001; Ahluwalia 2002; 
Purfield 2006; Topalova 2008). In our study, we consider 25 states covering more than 95% 
of the country’s population and 97.7% of country’s geographical area. Table 1 sets out the 
descriptive statistics. It shows that public sector banks account for major share of credit per 
capita in contrast to private and foreign banks. 
 
The regional mean values of the variables show substantial differences between leading and 
lagging states in almost all variables. For instance, real GDP per capita of lagging states is 
almost half of leading states. Distribution of bank credit per capita showed large inter-
regional variations. Lately, growth in real GDP has picked up in the lagging states.  
                                                          
4
 The lagged per-capita income captures state’s initial condition and as the level instead of the difference of the 
variable is used, the sign of its coefficient is expected to be positive. 
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As the following quadratic plots show, there is generally a positive association between per-
capita income and the credit offered by both bank types.  
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GDP Per Capita and Public Bank Credit
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However, the association between per-capita GDP and credit is stronger for credit offered by 
public banks than private banks, which can be judged by looking the R^2 , slope of the 
quadratic curve and compactness (standard deviation) of the data. 
In order to see whether this relationship still holds when we control all predictors 
simultaneously, based on generalised additive models methodology, we also run a locally 
weighted regression of per-capita GDP on the variables included in the empirical model. As 
can be seen from the plot, even after controling other predictors, there is a strong association 
between credit offered by public banks. Although positive, the significance of the association  
between GDP per-capita and private credit is relatively weaker. The association between 
human capital and GDP per-capita is more strong compared to capital expenditure and 
industrial output from GDP.  
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5. RESULTS  
 
We begin our empirical analysis by testing time series properties of the data, and the result 
showed that the variables have unit root in levels but stationary in first difference. The 
cointegration test also showed that the variables are cointegrated.
5
 We also tested for the 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. For autocorrelation, we followed the test 
proposed by Wooldridge (2002) and further discussed by Drukker (2003). The reported F 
statistics of the test is 3.2, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation 
cannot be rejected at 9%. Similarly, to test for panel level heteroscedasticity, we followed the 
groupwise heteroscedasticity test suggested by Greene (2000). The test is conducted on the 
residuals of a fixed effect regression model and null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected at less than 1%. In order to address the effect of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation on the results, we used robust estimator.  
 
The Arellano-Bond suggested test for autocorrelation AR(2) yields a p-value ranging from 
0.07 to 0.13, which means for almost all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
                                                          
5
 The test results can be provided upon request. 
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second-order autocorrelation of the error terms. The p-values of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions also suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, implying 
the instruments are valid. As discussed earlier, one key assumption in order to estimate the 
system GMM was that the endogenous and other control variables could be correlated with 
the unobserved effects, but this correlation is constant over time. This assumption is also 
tested using the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity (Wintoki et al. 2012). The p-values 
of the tests for all models suggest that null hypothesis is valid, namely the instruments used in 
level regressions are indeed exogenous.
6
 
 
Now we discuss the result of the dynamic GMM estimates, namely equation (5). We 
estimated the model by considering all samples as well as partitioning the sample into leading 
and lagging states. In addition, in order to see if the level of impact differs by types of bank, 
we estimated separate models by disaggregating the credit offered by private, public and 
foreign banks.  The empirical results are reported under Table 2 to 6. 
 
We first discuss the model results estimated by aggregating the credit offered by all the banks 
(Table 2). The finance variable is positive and significant both when the data of all the states 
is pooled as well as when the data is disaggregated on the basis of the level of development of 
the states. For the pooled data model, the result suggests that a 1% increase in credit offered 
by banks will generate a 0.02% increase in real per capita income. This finding is in line with 
the overall finance-growth literature indicating positive relationship between financial sector 
and economic growth. 
 
When the states are disaggregated into lagging and leading regions, although the impact of 
credit on growth is positive and significant in both groups, its impact is higher in the lagging 
regions. Possibly for lagging regions the only source of relatively easily accessible credit is 
bank credit, in contrast to the leading regions which could also borrow from stock market or 
from abroad (Onder and Ozyildirum, 2012). Also catch up effect could be taking place in the 
lagging regions which are generally deprived of capital.  
 
In order to compare the relative impact of credit offered by public, private and foreign banks 
on per capita income, we also estimated the model by types of bank. The results are reported 
                                                          
6
 The test result can be provided on request. 
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in Tables 3-6. Our findings corroborate the claim that public banks enhance growth of 
lagging regions by nullifying the financial market failures. This finding is contrary to the 
finding of La Porta et al. (2002) that government ownership of banks hinders economic 
growth and is more in alignment with Andrianova et al. (2009) and Burgess and Pande 
(2005).
7
  
 
From the results, it appears that the impact of credit offered by public banks is generally 
higher compared to private and foreign banks. The impact of public banks on real per capita 
income is significant in all cases and its impact is equal in both leading and lagging regions, 
despite the fact that the average amount of per capita credit offered in lagging regions is 
lower by 11%. It indicates higher productivity of bank finance and also implies that credit is 
undersupplied in lagging regions. The positive impact is in line with other recent studies in 
this area. Coleman and Feler (2015) examined whether during the times of financial crisis and 
instability government ownership of banks matters, and do these banks lend more and 
contribute to increased employment and incomes. They investigated this in the context of 
2601 localities in Brazil and considered four federally owned banks and 115 private banks 
having over 18,000 bank branches. Their findings suggest that areas with higher presence of 
state owned banks experienced increases in credit, GDP, employment and higher per capita 
incomes. It could also be that public banks may be providing credit (based on the 
development view) to socially valued projects which may not attract private banks. Tiwary 
and Thampy (2015) also found higher impact of public banks in rural areas and low income 
districts supporting the development view of state owned banks. An argument here could be 
that the presence of these banks due to government mandate could be more in the low income 
lagging regions. Yet, the data shows that population per bank branch is much higher in the 
less developed lagging states. Also despite the recent drive on financial inclusion, data 1997-
2015 shows highest average decline in population covered per bank branch in the developed 
leading states.  
 
Credit offered by private banks has a positive and significant impact on the growth of per-
capita income when the model is estimated based on the whole sample, but its impact 
                                                          
7
 Although public banks have been more risk bearing, they too can display risk averseness as Banerjee, Shawn 
and Duflo (2003) and Gupta, Kochhar and Panth (2011) argued that public banks may prefer to park funds in the 
government securities due to various reasons such as fear of corruption charges, as default may occur on loans 
and moral suasion and also due to what is called lazy banking.  
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becomes insignificant when the model is estimated by splitting the sample into leading and 
lagging states. Private banks display risk averseness as noted by Bhaumik and Piess (2006). 
The authors conjecture that risk behaviour of banks is negatively influenced by the quality of 
borrowers and ability of banks to diversify borrowers. Also, low geographical coverage of 
branch network of private banks and lack of information on the borrowers especially in the 
lagging regions may constrain them from extending credit. The risk aversion of the banks 
also may be due to presence of non-performing assets and is reflected in their large 
investments in government securities, more than what is statutorily required (Bhaumik and 
Piess 2006). Also the private banks in the presence of volatility could withdraw from lending 
(Coleman and Feler 2015). 
 
When the model is estimated using the whole sample, credit offered by foreign banks has no 
significant impact on per capita income growth. However, if estimated by disaggregating the 
states according to their level of development, credit offered by foreign banks is significant in 
leading regions, but not in lagging states. The presence of foreign banks is negligible in all 
the regions barring relatively developed western and southern regions. In a study on the entry 
of foreign banks in India during the nineties, Gormley (2007) established that foreign banks 
financed only a small number of firms. Further, they use locational advantages by ‘cherry 
picking’ and locate in already developed and fast-growing regions, and regions or locations 
less developed are overlooked. Overall, heterogeneity in different impacts of different bank 
groups could be due to several other factors such as state specific characteristics, its specific 
endowments – institutions, infrastructure, quality of projects, magnitude of credit, innovative 
projects which to lead to spurt in growth or existing working capital to firms.    
 
When the impact of other control variables is considered, the rate of growth in per-capita 
income level is strongly related to initial per-capita income, stock of human and physical 
capital and share of the industrial sector output. The magnitude and the sign of the coefficient 
of the lagged income per capita is negative and less than one. It suggests a degree of 
convergence among the states and it is consistent with the findings of previous studies.
8
  
                                                          
8
 The empirical finding on whether there is convergence or divergence is however mixed. A number of studies 
have shown absolute divergence in per capita income in Indian states (Marjit and Mitra (1996), Ghosh et al. 
(1998), Raman (1997), Dasgupta at al. (2000), Rao et al. (1999), Aiyer (2001), Ahluwalia (2000); Kumar and 
Subramaniam 2012. Some have shown convergence. More recent literature for instance, Rowan (2015) and 
Cherodian and Thirlwall (2016) show divergence and weak convergence. Increased inequality across the states, 
low investment levels, high share of agriculture and lack of good institutions could be some of the reasons for 
divergence among the states. 
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In leading regions, productivity of physical capital is significant, but not in lagging regions. 
This holds in all cases. The variable that represents the share of industrial output is significant 
in lagging regions, but not in leading regions. The level of human capital stock has a 
significant impact on the growth in per capita income in leading states. In the lagging states, 
the variable is not significant when public banks credit is introduced as the explanatory 
variable of the model. However, it is significant when all banks are considered together and 
when disaggregated into private and foreign banks, perhaps implying that human capital is 
important in lagging states and can have positive impact on growth despite the insignificant 
impact of bank credit. In consistence with other studies, the results also show that public 
capital expenditure is positive and significant especially for leading states in all regressions 
(Misra, 2012; Bose and Bhanumurthy, 2013). This result is also consistent with the findings 
of other studies. For instance, RBI (2016) reported that public capital expenditure generates 
more growth than revenue expenditure. Using the data for the period 2001-02 to 2013-14, the 
results showed that capital expenditure impacts per capita GDP growth positively, in contrast 
increase in non-development expenditure has a negative impact on growth. Further, shifting 
public expenditure in favour of capital expenditure in the presence of fiscal deficit results in 
positive contribution to economic growth. 
 
5.1 Robustness Checks 
 
The key assumptions on which the estimation of the model rests are: the instruments are 
relevant and appropriate and there are no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. For the 
latter, we follow the test suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and test for the absence of 
correlation between second-differenced idiosyncratic errors. This test is mainly concerned 
with whether or not we have included enough lags so that there are no autocorrelations of 
error terms. If the autocorrelation is removed any historical value of the variables beyond 
those lags are potentially valid instruments. For the validity of the instruments or to test 
whether the instruments are exogenous, we follow the Sargan and Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions. As indicated above, although the system GMM addresses some 
shortcomings of the difference GMM, it assumes that unobserved heterogeneity is time 
invariant. In contrast to the difference GMM, this estimator includes level equation based on 
this assumption and therefore robustness of the result depends on its validity. In most cases, 
this estimator is used by making an additional assumption that the correlation between 
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unobserved state specific effects and the endogenous variables is fixed or constant over time. 
The validity of this assumption will be tested using a difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity 
(Wintoki et al. 2012).  
 
As a robustness check, although not reported here, using the Arellano and Bover (1995) we 
estimated all models using a “forward” orthogonal deviation transformation. In this case, we 
used average future observations of the variable as instrument rather than the first difference 
or lag values of the variable as instruments. This allows us to avoid the assumption that there 
is constant correlation between the endogenous variables and state specific effect. We also 
estimated a difference GMM as an additional robustness check. The conclusion remained the 
same, but the coefficient of the finance variable in the pooled data model is 0.06 and 
significant at 1% and public bank credit variable has a coefficient estimate of 0.07, which is 
significant at less than 1%. The coefficient estimates for credit offered by private and foreign 
banks are insignificant. Although the presence of a lagged dependent variable bias the result, 
when a within fixed effect model is estimated, the results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported here. In general, irrespective of estimation method, bank credit increases per capita 
income, but the impact of credit offered by public banks is stronger in all cases.  
 
In order to check whether productivity of public credit differs by degree of development, we 
also estimated a pooled model, namely by pooling the data of lagging and leading states. In 
the model we introduced a dummy variable that categorizes samples into lagging and leading. 
A value of 1 is given for the leading and 0 for the lagging states. We also introduced another 
variable by interacting this dummy with the credit offered by public banks. The finance 
variable is still positive and highly significant with a coefficient value of 0.038. However, the 
dummy variable, although positive, is not significant. The interaction term, however, is 
negative but still insignificant. It means, although productivity of credit offered by public 
banks is higher in lagging regions, the difference in productivity between lagging and leading 
states is not significant (the result can be provided on request). Therefore, it is difficult to 
establish whether the credit offered by public banks is more productive in lagging states.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Government intervention in banking sector is expected to overcome some of the barriers due 
to lack of information and increased risks and assist economic growth of less developed 
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regions, thus reducing regional disparities. In this study, we examined whether public sector 
banks, are contributing to economic growth of the less developed states in India.  
The empirical results consistently suggest that the level of financial development is a key 
determinant of regional income growth as well as a determinant of the speed and degree of 
convergence in per capita income across spatial locations. Our analysis also looked at 
disaggregated credit offered by private, public and foreign banks. The result generally 
suggests that the credit offered by public banks generates higher growth. Although credit 
offered by private banks generates income growth in developed regions, its impact on lagging 
regions is insignificant. The results generally support the claim that state interventions in the 
form of public banks could counteract the adverse effect of market failure in financial 
markets and promote growth and regional equity. However, the differential relative impact of 
public banks in lagging regions is insensitive to aggregation. Accordingly, although the result 
showed that public banks generate more growth in general, it is not possible to clearly 
establish whether the growth impact of public banks is higher in lagging regions.    
 
Considering positive and significant contributions of bank credit to per capita income growth 
of the lagging states, and also the role of the industry, some of the policy implications 
emerging from our research are that promoting industrialization in lagging regions may 
speedup regional convergence. This will assist in reducing regional disparities, pushing 
economic growth and improving credit absorption capacity of the less developed states. This 
policy implication is applicable in other developing countries as well where financial sector 
can be channelized as a tool to promote industrial sector for achieving strong regional 
growth.      
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of financial and economic indicators (1996-2008) 
 All States Leading Lagging 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Mean 
Real GDP (Rs bln) 547.5 648.3 8.6 4339.4 794.3 374.1 
Real GDP Per capita (Rs) 10641 4190 3100 24010 13921 8578 
Growth in Real GDP 16.0 9.0 -8.3 30.2 12.8 12.0 
Growth in Real GDP per 
capita 
5.5 2.5 0.6 9.0 
5.0 3.9 
Bank credit/GDP 383 24.4 5.7 145.4 52.0 28.2 
Bank credit per capita 6931 8711 505 71702 11771 3543 
Public sector bank 
credit/GDP 
30.7 16.7 5.7 101.6 
39.9 30.7 
Public sector bank credit 
per capita 
5421 6720.4 452  
51870 
8941 2958 
Private sector bank 
credit/GDP 
6.8 10.8 0.0 67.2 
10.8 4.0 
Private sector bank credit 
per capita 
1291 2260.4 0 14534 
578 2340 
Foreign bank/credit/GDP 1.5 3.1 0.0 15.3 3.2 0.3 
Foreign banks credit per 
capita 
410 893 0 5774 
767 66 
Source: Computed by authors. 
 
Table 2 : Bank Credit and State level Income Growth 
 Variables ALL  LEADING         LAGGING 
Lnyt-1 -0.06** -0.04 -0.07** 
  (-2.91) (-1.27) (-2.71) 
lrH 0.12* 0.10* 0.16*   
  (2.39) (2.21) (2.11) 
lnF 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*  
  (3.92) (3.52) (2.23) 
lnK 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.15 
  (3.91) (4.63) (1.57) 
IND 0.11** 0.06 0.10*   
  (3.10) (0.87) (1.99) 
_cons 0.23 0.14 0.36 
  (1.77) (0.55) (1.88) 
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N 216 110 106 
sargan 156.95 124.21 73.85 
sarganp 0.93 0.05 0.97 
hansen 18.16 6.83 8.61 
hansenp 1 1 1 
ar2 1.51 -0.5 1.5 
ar2p 0.13 0.61 0.13 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: Own Calculation based on the Survey Data 
 
Table 3: Public Bank Credit and State level Per capita Income Growth 
 Variables ALL                               LEADING         LAGGING   
Lnyt-1 -0.04* -0.06 -0.05**   
  (-2.57) (-1.57) (55.48)   
lrH 0.08 0.09* 0.14   
  (1.46) (2.02) (1.90)   
lnF 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*     
  (3.92) (3.53) (2.23)   
lnK 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.11   
  (3.51) (3.86) (1.5)   
IND 0.05 0.03 0.06   
  (1.41) (0.54) (1.31)   
_cons 0.14 0.27 0.22   
  (1.55) (0.97) (1.89)   
N 276 118 158   
sargan 169.41 111.41 112.72   
sarganp 0.98 0.34 0.96   
hansen 21.08 4.58 11.61   
hansenp 1 1 1   
ar2 1.72 -1.29 1.77   
ar2p 0.09 0.2 0.08   
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
Source: Own Calculation based on the Survey Data   
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Table 4 : Private Banks' Credit and State level Income Growth 
 Variables           ALL                          LEADING          LAGGING                                   
Lnyt-1 -0.03 -0.00 -0.06 
  (-1.63) (-0.18) (-1.95) 
lrH 0.12* 0.13** 0.25**  
  (2.56) (3.14) (2.7) 
lnF 0.004* 0.003 0.004 
  (2.19) (1.40) (1.83) 
lnK 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.08 
  (3.66) (4.85) (1.19) 
IND 0.11** 0.01 0.12*** 
  (3.16) (0.16) (4.29) 
_cons 0.13 -0.07 0.39 
  (1.12) (-0.37) (1.76) 
N 262 118 144 
sargan 172.78 111.9 103.03 
sarganp 0.96 0.33 0.97 
hansen 20.4 3.99 10.36 
hansenp 1 1 1 
ar2 1.62 -1.14 1.65 
ar2p 0.1 0.25 0.1 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: Own Calculation based on the Survey Data 
 
 
Table 5: Foreign Bank Credit and State level Income Growth 
 Variables ALL               LEADING         LAGGING   
Lnyt-1 -0.03 -.0.01 -0.04   
  (-1.77) (-0.46) (-1.96)   
lrH 0.19*** 0.16** 0.23***   
  (4.10) (3.10) (3.42)   
lnF 0.003 0.005* 0.002   
  (1.76) (2.34) (0.93)   
lnK 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.18   
  (4.31) (5.48) (1.86)   
IND 0.08 0.01 0.12**    
  (1.73) (0.08) (2.61)   
_cons 0.11 -0.06 0.23   
  (0.91) (-0.31) (1.32)   
N 210 110 100   
sargan 156.04 127.44 65.66   
sarganp 0.89 0.03 0.98   
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hansen 19.66 6.78 6.27   
hansenp 1 1 1   
ar2 1.48 -0.92 1.5   
ar2p 0.14 0.36 0.13   
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
Source: Own Calculation based on the Survey Data   
 
Table 6: Bank Credit and State Level Income Growth (Pooled data) 
 Variables 
PUBLIC                   ALL 
BANKS       
Lnyt-1 -0.04* -0.06*           
  (-2.57) (-2.51)           
lrH 0.09 0.12*             
  (1.66) (2.53)           
Interaction1 -0.001                           
  (-0.15)                           
dum_la_le 0.02 -0.03           
  (0.24) (-0.54)              
lnF 0.02**                           
  (2.77)                           
lnK 0.17*** 0.20***           
  (3.63) (3.92)           
IND 0.05 0.11**            
  (1.32) (3.04)           
Interaction2   0.001           
    (0.63)           
lnallbankpcc   0.02**            
    (2.84)           
_cons 0.19 0.28           
  (1.78) (1.68)           
N 276 216           
sargan 170.02 157.1           
sarganp 0.97 0.91           
hansen 20.56 17.74           
hansenp 1 1           
ar2 1.72 1.51           
ar2p 0.08 0.13           
t statistics in parentheses.             
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001             
Interaction1=Public credit*region dummy, where 1 is for leading and 0 for lagging.   
Interaction2=Bank credit by all banks*region dummy, where 1 is for leading and 0 for lagging. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1: Classification of states based on per capita income 
Leading States Lagging States 
Gujarat  Assam 
Haryana Bihar 
Himachal Pradesh Jharkhand 
Karnataka Madhya Pradesh 
Kerala Chattisgarh 
Maharashtra Orissa 
Punjab Rajasthan 
Tamilnadu Uttar Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh West Bengal 
Arunachal Pradesh Manipur 
 Meghalaya 
 Mizoram 
 Nagaland 
 Tripura 
 Jammu & Kashmir 
 
 
 
